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1. Social evaluation of variation in a change perspective 
 
Text genres that introduce or overview sociolinguistics as a discipline (historical accounts, 
introductory books, handbooks), normally group attitudes and ideology with the applications 
(language planning, politics, education, etc.), or with the type of topics (language contact, choice, 
multilingualism, etc.) that characterizes the sociology of language tradition Against this backdrop, 
the present handbook’s inclusion of a language attitudes chapter in its “Language Variation and 
Change” section is noteworthy. 
 Theories that aim to explain language change processes operate with a number of 
“factors” that make up these processes. There is little disagreement about what to put in the total 
pool of factors, but views differ as to how the different factors interrelate and function. The 
fundamental question is which factor(s) we should conceive of as the driving force, and which ones 
we should consider as conditions. The factors may be differently grouped in theoretical 
frameworks, but in general such different groupings do not reflect the theory’s answer to the 
driving-force versus conditions question. If a theory operates with the common distinction between 
internal and external factors, internal factors will typically refer to possibilities and constraints in 
terms of fundamental speaker/hearer-based processing capacities (articulation and perception) in 
interplay with a concrete language system, while external factors will cover possibilities and 
constraints in terms of the material and ideological aspects of social structure. The distinction itself 
does not imply any commitment as to where the driving force is to be found. The same can be said 
of William Labov’s division of his monumental work on Principles of Linguistic Change into three 
volumes, subtitled Internal Factors (1994), Social Factors (2001), and Cognitive Factors (forthc.). 
 However, if I in this chapter operate with a distinction between subjective factors 
(social values and evaluations) and objective factors (all the others), it is not only because it gives 
me a cover term for “attitudes, ideology and awareness”, but mainly because it reflects the 
theoretical position I want to advocate, namely that language change is driven by what I prefer to 
call “subconscious attitudes”. This position is derived from our research in Denmark, which I shall 
return to at the end (section 3). But the main bulk of the chapter is a presentation and discussion of 
Labov’s work – simply because this is where we find the main effort within variationism to theorize 
the role of subjective factors on the basis of independent empirical data (i.e. other data than the 
language use data). 
 
2. The theoretical and empirical status of subjective factors in 
Labovian variationism 
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From the beginning of variationism, as it was developed in the work of Labov, the social unit of 
research was the speech community. This entity was defined at the level of subjective, not objective, 
facts about language use. 
 
(1) 
The speech community is not defined by any marked agreement in the use of 
language elements, so much as by participation in a set of shared norms […] In 
fact, it seems plausible to define a speech community as a group of speakers 
who share a set of social attitudes towards language (1972: 120f., 248). 
 
In their agenda-setting paper on the Empirical foundations for a theory of language change, 
Weinreich, Labov and Herzog (1968) listed evaluation among the five problems that had to be 
solved by the theory, namely the problems of transmission, embedding (linguistic and social), 
evaluation, actuation, and constraints. The first three of these in particular had been addressed 
empirically in Labov’s research during the first half of the 1960s on Martha’s Vineyard (1963) and 
in New York City (1966) and were thoroughly discussed in his seminal book Sociolinguistic 
patterns (1972). The evaluation problem was defined as follows: 
 
(2) 
The evaluation problem is to find the subjective (or latent) correlates of 
the objective (or manifest) changes which have been observed. The 
indirect approach to this problem correlates the general attitudes and 
aspirations of the informants with their linguistic behaviour. The more 
direct approach is to measure the unconscious subjective reactions of the 
informants to values of the linguistic variable itself (1972: 162). 
 
This definition allows for three observations that relate to the issues we need to address: the 
independent-evidence issue (2.1), the consciousness issue (2.2), and the driving-force issue (2.3). 
 
2.1 The “independent-evidence” issue 
 
Labov’s solution to the problem of defining the speech community was derived from the discovery 
that people differ far more in their use of language than in their evaluations of the different uses. It 
goes without saying that the collection and analysis of independent subjective data were a 
prerequisite for that discovery. Also, if not explicitly formulated, it clearly is an implicit statement 
of Labov’s definition of the evaluation problem that it can not be solved on the basis of facts about 
language use (“the objective (or manifest) changes”); its solution requires a search for independent 
evidence (“the subjective (or latent) correlates”). Such evidence has been obtained and analysed in 
all of Labov’s projects. The data are obtained in sociolinguistic interviews or group conversations 
and may be of two types: discursive (2.1.1), and experimental (2.1.2). 
 The insistence on the need for independent evidence is important, in order to avoid 
circular argumentation in the driving-force issue. To the extent that the subjectivities involved in 
language variation and change are not studied using independent data, it is hard to see how, in a 
principled way, we can constrain our ingenuity in pointing out ideologies that would appear as 
“good fits” and explanations for the established patterns of use. An example would be the different 
explanations that have been offered for the well-documented finding that women generally speak 
more “correctly” than men. 
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2.1.1 Discursive data 
 
The discursive data consist of responses to, or comments about, questions that somehow relate to 
language. Such questions and responses may address the issue of language-related values and 
evaluations either directly (i), or indirectly (ii). 
 
(i) Evaluative responses with direct language-related relevance 
When language-related questions are posed directly, informants’ answers or comments will 
typically draw on well-known public discourses and appear very much the same, in one and the 
same speech community. Labov repeatedly refers to “the fundamental sociolinguistic question 
posed to me in 1967 by a woman from New York: “Why do I say [wɒi] when I don’t want to?”” 
(2001: 215; italics in original; see also 1972: 308). He found that “New Yorkers show a general 
hostility towards New York City speech which emerges in countless ways. The term ‘linguistic self-
hatred’ is not too extreme to apply to the situation which emerges from the interviews” (1966: 344). 
Thus, analyses of “what they say” may shed light on the significance of social values and evaluation 
for language use. 
 
(ii) Evaluative responses with indirect language-related relevance 
Answers to questions about something other than language may allow researchers to characterize 
and group informants according to attitudes and values that can be assumed to be language-related 
in an indirect way. For instance, collected utterances about life on Martha’s Vineyard were used by 
Labov to group the informants in three categories according to whether their expressed feelings 
were positive, neutral, or negative towards the island. Patterns emerging from such data and 
analyses may be of relevance for the study of language-related values and their role in language 
variation and change. 
 
2.1.2 Experimental data 
 
A second type of evaluative interview data results from elicitations that are more or less 
experimental in character. These evaluations may be divided according to whether they concern the 
informants’ own language (i), or the language of others (ii). In both respects, a further distinction is 
possible according to whether the evaluations concern specific variants (most often variant 
pronunciations of words), or whole varieties (languages or dialects). As it is the specific-variant 
approach that characterizes Labov’s work, I focus on that approach here (and return to the “holistic” 
approach in section 3).  
 
(i) Evaluations of own language 
As developed in the classic variationist projects in New York (1966) and Norwich (Trudgill 1974), 
self-evaluation tests (also referred to as self-report tests) aim to tap into informants’ representations 
(perceptions and evaluations) of their own speech and are designed to “measure” these 
representations in terms of some sort of comparison, with the possibility of detecting interesting 
“discrepancies” in the way informants relate to variant pronunciations of words. 
 In one design, the task of the informants is to select which one of two variant 
pronunciations of a word they think is correct, and then indicate which variant they usually use 
themselves (e.g. ‘aunt’ pronounced as either ant or ænt). If what an informant claims to be “correct” 
and their self-reported forms are not the same, the discrepancy can be made the object of 
interpretation; it might for instance be thought to signal a lack of confidence that one’s own 
language is “good enough”. Data from a series of such choices (eighteen in all) allowed Labov to 
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assign scores to his New York informants on an index of linguistic insecurity, and thus to 
characterize and compare individuals and social groups in terms of linguistic insecurity. One might 
argue that the discrepancy indicates a lack of confidence in one’s own language, resulting from the 
general ideological “climate” which monitors the uses of language in the community. 
 
(ii) Evaluations of language spoken by others 
Around 1960, the Canadian social psychologist Wallace Lambert and his colleagues developed an 
experimental technique, known as the matched guise technique, which was designed to elicit 
language attitudes at the level of varieties, e.g. English and French in Quebec (Lambert et al. 1960, 
Lambert 1967). The idea of the approach is to collect evaluations controlling for the effects of voice 
quality and linguistic content. The basic procedure is to tape-record one and the same bilingual, or 
bidialectal, person reading the same text in the two (or more) varieties under study, and then have 
listeners assess the readings (the “matched guises”). In order to prevent listener-judges from 
realizing that the same person appears twice (or several times), the guises are separated on the tape 
by filler-voices. Assessments are made on some kind of evaluative scales. 
 In Labov’s projects (1966: ch.11, 2001: section 6.3), the so-called subjective reaction 
test uses the matched guise technique in an adaptation which aims to elicit evaluation at the level of 
linguistic variants. The stimulus speakers appear several times on the tape, in random order, each 
time reading a sentence which concentrates examples of one of the variables investigated. In 
addition, each speaker reads a “zero sentence” with no variables of interest. The judges’ evaluations 
of readings with a high concentration of examples of the variables investigated may then be 
analysed as either upgrading or downgrading in comparison with the evaluation of the zero 
sentence. Evaluations have been made on scales of “job suitability” and “friendliness” – which may 
be said to represent a more fundamental value distinction, treated by social psychologists in terms 
of competence versus sociability, or also status versus solidarity (Ryan, Giles & Sebastian 1982: 8). 
The possible relevance of such value distinctions for the theory of language change – and the role of 
subjective factors in change processes – seems quite obvious. Labov estimates that “[t]he most 
fruitful experimental measures of subjective reactions to linguistic variation have been through 
matched guise tests, […]” (2001: 194; italics in original). 
 
2.2 The consciousness issue 
 
Why does the matched guise technique produce the more fruitful data? The quote above continues 
by qualifying the matched guise tests as tests “[…] which tap subjects’ unconscious attitudes 
towards languages and dialects”. The important word here appears to be the word unconscious. 
 We recall that Labov’s definition of the evaluation problem operates with two 
methodological approaches to its solution (see quote 2). The “indirect approach” involves gathering 
data that shed light on “general attitudes and aspirations”. The reference here, to judge from 
Labov’s empirical research as outlined above, is to data from discourse and self-reporting. The 
more “direct approach” involves gathering of “unconscious subjective reactions”, and is tantamount 
to matched guise testing. 
 In brief, the “subjective correlates” may be either conscious or unconscious. And so 
we may reformulate our question: why is it that unconscious attitudes are the more useful data? We 
cannot answer that question without considering the place and role of consciousness within Labov’s 
theoretical framework in general (2.2.1). Having done that, we shall return to considering in what 
sense Labov’s use of the matched guise technique taps into unconscious attitudes (2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1 The ubiquity of un-/consciousness in Labov’s framework 
Page 4 of 19 
 
 
In fact, the notion of consciousness is of crucial importance not only when the search for 
“subjective correlates” is on the agenda. This holds true for Labov’s entire approach to the study of 
language variation and change. To start with, the consciousness dimension is (described and 
understood as) crucial to the phenomenon of linguistic change as such – changes are classified 
according to whether they come from above or below consciousness (i). Furthermore, reference to 
the consciousness dimension makes up the fundamental basis – for the classification of linguistic 
variables into stereotypes, markers, and indicators (ii), – for the style analyses in terms of careful 
versus casual speech (iii), – and, more implicitly, for the discussion of language ideology in terms 
of overt versus covert norms and values (iv). 
 
(i) Change from above and change from below 
It is a commonplace in sociolinguistics to link the distinction between change from above and 
change from below to the dimension of consciousness. For instance, A Dictionary of 
Sociolinguistics (Swann, Deumert, Lillis and Mesthrie 2004: 35f.) explicates the notions as follows: 
 
(3) 
change from above […] linguistic changes of which speakers are consciously aware (the 
linguistic forms involved in the change are said to be ‘above’ the level of social awareness) 
 
change from below Linguistic changes of which speakers are not consciously aware (the 
linguistic forms involved are said to be ‘below’ the level of social awareness) 
 
The focus on consciousness reflects similar explications in Labov’s own writings, e.g. “change from 
below, that is, below the level of social awareness” (1972: 178; 2001: 279). Recently, Labov again 
noted about the above/below distinction that “[t]his terminology does not imply higher or lower on 
the socioeconomic scale” (2007: 346 footnote 2), even though we also read that ““Above” and 
“below” refer here simultaneously to levels of social awareness and positions in the socioeconomic 
hierarchy” (Labov 1994: 78). 
 One half of the claimed parallelism between social awareness and the socioeconomic 
hierarchy is easy to grasp and accept, in so far as “Changes from above are introduced by the 
dominant social class, often with full public awareness. Normally, they represent borrowings from 
other speech communities that have higher prestige in the view of the dominant class” (ibid: 78; 
italics in original). The other half of the claimed parallelism is harder to follow, partly because 
“[c]hanges from below may be introduced by any social class” (1994: 78), but mainly because the 
claims about (the absence of) consciousness in changes from below seem more problematic. I shall 
return to this problem in connection with the driving force issue (section 2.3), but first we need to 
touch on the importance of un-/consciousness to other fundamental distinctions in the Labovian 
framework. 
 
(ii) Stereotypes, markers, and indicators 
Three types of linguistic variables are differentiated, essentially in terms of social awareness, 
additionally in terms of patterns of use. 
 
(4) 
Some variables are the overt topics of social comment and show both correction 
and hypercorrection (stereotypes); others are not at the same high level of social 
awareness, but show consistent stylistic and social stratification (markers); still 
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others are never commented on or even recognized by native speakers, but are 
differentiated only in their relative degrees of advancement among the initiating 
social groups (indicators) (1994: 78; italics in original). 
 
A change from below appears in the vernacular. At first, there is no social awareness of the 
variation, and the use of the variable by community members produces a systematic pattern only in 
terms of social-group membership; the variants used are indicators of social affiliation. As the 
social awareness surrounding the variable rises, the variants become markers of social affiliation, 
and the pattern of use no longer shows only systematic social-group related variation but also 
systematic  stylistic (i.e. social-context related) variation. Whether the change comes from above or 
below, the variation may become the object of high level social awareness and strong evaluations, 
mostly in terms of negative comments concerning one of the variants; the variable has become a 
stereotype, and its use shows correctional behaviour of a more irregular kind (see e.g. 2001: 196). 
  
(iii) Careful and casual speech 
As raised social awareness is accompanied by style shifting, we are not surprised to learn that 
Labov’s analysis of stylistic variation is founded on the notion of attention, i.e. a notion with clear 
links to consciousness and awareness.  
 
(5) 
There are a great many styles and stylistic dimensions that can be isolated 
by an analyst. But we find that styles can be ranged along a single 
dimension, measured by the amount of attention paid to speech (1972: 208; 
italics in original). 
 
[Subjective reaction tests] must be considered as sensitive measures of the 
place of a given variable on a scale of social awareness. As a rule, social 
awareness of a given variable corresponds to the slope of style shifting 
(2001: 196). 
 
In terms of social embedding, stylistic variation is analysed along a single contextual dimension. 
The speech situation is manipulated in the sociolinguistic interview and is characterized as more or 
less formal. The basic idea is that a more formal context triggers more attention to speech, which in 
turn triggers a more careful speech. Inversely, a less formal context triggers less attention to speech, 
which in turn triggers a less careful, more casual, speech. This conception of stylistic variation has 
been much criticised (see e.g. Milroy and Gordon 2003: 200ff.), but what we need to notice is again 
the decisive importance accorded to unconsciously produced (unmonitored) speech. “[T]he 
vernacular [is] the style in which the minimum attention is given to the monitoring of speech” 
(1972: 208). Monitoring yields irregular patterns of use (cf. stereotypes above), whereas the less 
monitored – casual, vernacular – styles yield “more systematic speech, where the fundamental 
relations which determine the course of linguistic evolution can be seen most clearly” (1972: 208). 
 
(iv) Overt and covert values 
Any study of ‘attitudes’ and ‘ideology’ needs to start by somehow explicating these entities in terms 
of social meanings, norms, or values. Ever since the New York study, Labov’s basic distinction in 
the realm of language ideology has been between overt and covert social values. This distinction, 
however, has never been based, like the speech-related distinctions in (ii) and (iii) above, on explicit 
reference to awareness or attention. 
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 The connection between the dimensions of social values (in terms of overt vs. covert) 
and consciousness (in terms of above vs. below, or conscious vs. unconscious) is clear so far as the 
as the “overt–conscious” connection is concerned. “The process [of ‘overt social pressures applied 
from above’, TK] is out in the open for us to observe, in public performances, in the attitudes of 
teachers in the schools, and in the conscious reactions of some middle class persons” (1966: 224). 
In contrast, the “covert–unconscious” connection is harder to establish with reference to explicit 
claims in Labov’s writings. Consider, however, the following statements: 
 
(6) 
For change from below, there is no important distinction between stigmatized and prestige 
forms: the speech form assumed by each group may be taken as an unconscious mark of self-
identification (1966: 225f.). 
 
(7) 
There are surely other values [than the overt values, TK], at a deeper level of consciousness, 
which reinforce the vernacular speech forms of New York City. […] recent studies of the 
black English vernacular in New York City have demonstrated the existence of such covert 
norms […] (1972: 177). 
 
By contrast with change from above, which we know to be accompanied by overt, conscious, social 
valuations (stigma or prestige), change from below is said in (6) to be accompanied by social 
valuations to do with group- and self-identification – which are unconscious. I take it that an alleged 
unconscious act of social identification will have to be classified, in terms of the overt–covert 
distinction, as a manifestation of covert values. If so, establishment of a ‘covert–unconscious’ 
connection appears the natural inference from quote (6). Quote (7), on the other hand, links covert 
norms or values, not to the unconscious, but to a deeper level of consciousness. 
 To judge from Labov’s work in general, no important theoretical distinction is implied 
by glosses like “a deeper level of consciousness” on the one hand, and “unconscious” or “below 
consciousness” on the other hand. To me, this is an important issue, which I shall return to. Here I 
just want to suggest that the “parallelisms” in the theoretical framework favour an understanding 
which connects “covert” with “unconscious” – the point being that Labov’s claims about the 
absence of consciousness in social valuations (no matter how “covert” they might be) are akin to his 
claims about the absence of consciousness in changes from below, and just as problematic. 
 
2.2.2 Consciousness, values and the matched guise technique 
 
We set out in section 2.2 to shed light on the claim that “unconscious attitudes”, obtained by using 
the matched guise technique, are more valuable as data for students of language change than are 
conscious attitudes. We have seen (in 2.2.1) that the notion of consciousness (awareness, attention) 
is of paramount importance to Labov’s understanding and analysis of how language in use varies 
and changes, and furthermore that the interesting (systematic) facts of change take place “below 
consciousness”, when minimal or no awareness is involved in the use of language. In brief, the 
priorities of the Labovian framework lie with unconscious linguistic variation and change. We can 
conclude that the conception of unconscious attitudes as the more valuable data type in the 
evaluative dimension appears natural, even mandatory, within the framework as a whole. 
 However, the notion of unconscious attitudes as used by Labov needs further 
clarification. We have argued above (in 2.2.1) that the parallelisms between the analytical 
dimensions (consciousness, class, context, and values) invite us to infer that covert values are 
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‘below consciousness’. It seems, then, that what Labov’s matched guise tests are said to be doing, 
as they tap into “unconscious attitudes”, is to uncover “covert values”, the social motivations from 
below. Accordingly, sociolinguists tend to discuss the aim and potentiality of matched guise testing 
in terms of attitudes that are “covert” (e.g. Fasold 1984: 164) or “private” (e.g. Garrett, Coupland 
and Williams 2003: 57). There is nothing surprising in this when seen against the parallelisms in 
Labov’s theoretical framework. 
 Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that we would be mistaken if we take 
unconscious attitudes, as obtained in Labov’s matched guise tests, to mean ‘covert values’. The 
main reason, of course, is that the test’s measuring instrument – the job suitability and friendship 
scales – simply is Labov’s operationalisation of the distinction between overt and covert values. 
Hence, the “unconscious attitudes” obtained in the New York project, where only a job suitability 
scale was included in the test, were never meant (nor considered) to be reflections of covert values 
(1966: 284; 1972: 177). In Philadelphia, the friendship scale was added in the hope of producing 
evidence for covert subjective reactions. But as the “unconscious attitudes” obtained on the 
friendship scale by and large replicated the results of the job suitability scale, Labov concludes by 
pointing to a lack of success in establishing the existence of covert values (more about this in 2.3.2 
below). 
 In the perspective of our discussion here, it is interesting to note that Labov argues 
that the difficulties experienced in establishing independent evidence for covert values should be 
ascribed to the conditions of data collection. The argument goes something like this: In our attempts 
to elicit covert values, we have only come “as far as one can in a field experiment” (2001: 216), 
which is not very far, because covert values “do not readily emerge in formal situations” (2001: 24). 
– Yes, but we have seen how the contextual-formality dimension is linked to, in fact based on, the 
dimension of consciousness/awareness/attention; what emerges at a certain level of formality is a 
function of the level of consciousness involved. Thus, it seems to me that what the argument really 
says is something like: no evidence of covert values is found because the attitudes expressed in the 
matched guise experiment are “conscious”. 
 Indeed, “conscious attitudes” make much more sense than “unconscious attitudes”. 
Consider the following conditions of data collection: The Philadelphia matched guise was carried 
out “in course of the second interviews. […] The “second” interview was in many cases a third, 
fourth, or even tenth recording made by the field workers” (2001: 207, 334). The job suitability 
question was phrased: “What is the highest job this person could hold, speaking as she does?” 
(2001: 207). There can be little doubt that the Philadelphia informants evaluated the matched guise 
speakers in full awareness of giving away attitudes towards dialect differences. 
 In fact, there is no indication that Labov ever aimed at obtaining conditions which 
might produce “unconscious attitudes” in the sense of attitudes offered by respondents who are 
unaware of offering attitudes towards dialect differences (which is what we aim at in our Danish 
studies; section 3 below). On the contrary, about the matched guise test in the New York project, he 
says that: “The respondents were told that this test was the most important part of the interview: 
since we had already learned how they themselves used the English language, we then wanted to 
know how they felt about the way other New Yorkers used it” (1966: 281f.). Respondents were 
actually controlled for whether they could hear dialect differences between the speakers (or 
sentences) on the test tape: Three respondents were described as “dialect deaf”, whereas “the great 
majority heard clear-cut differences between the test sentences” (ibid: 284). 
 What does Labov mean then by labelling his matched guise data “unconscious” 
(attitudes, evaluations, reactions)? As it turns out, Labov’s real reason for prioritizing the matched 
guise data is that these data are systematic: 
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(8) 
The type of evaluative behavior that I would like to measure here is 
more systematic, more completely internalized than any reply to overt 
questions about speech. We are searching for the evaluative norms 
which reflect the complex and regular structures in [the social 
differentiation of language use] (1966: 280). 
 
[…] attitudes do not emerge in a systematic form if the subject is 
questioned directly about dialects; but if he makes two sets of 
personality judgements about the same speaker using two different 
forms of language, and does not realize that it is the same speaker, his 
subjective evaluations of language will emerge as the differences in the 
two ratings (1972: 146; italics in original). 
 
It seems clear that Labov’s “unconscious attitudes” refers more to an aspect of the data-collection 
technique than to the nature of the data. His respondents are not unconscious of offering attitudes 
towards language; they are unconscious of offering attitudes towards the same speaker several 
times, or, in case they realize this, unable to let it influence their ratings. (“As the listener reacted to 
a particular sentence, he would not be able to know exactly how he had rated the same speaker in a 
previous utterance”, 1966: 281). Thus, what Labov’s matched-guise experiments collect is not 
“unconscious” language attitudes, but evaluative reactions towards language of a more “systematic” 
kind than obtained in interview answers. 
 
2.3 The driving-force issue 
 
Put simply, the driving-force issue (see section 1) boils down to the question of “what comes first”: 
does change in use result from change in attitudes, or does change in attitudes result from change in 
use? As correlation does not imply a cause–effect relationship, stating that “the evaluation problem 
is to find the subjective (or latent) correlates of the objective (or manifest) changes which have been 
observed” (see quote (2)), does not in itself commit Labov to a particular position on the driving 
force issue. Actually, Labov’s position on the issue has never appeared particularly clear-cut to me, 
but I think it is right to point out a repositioning on his part from before Philadelphia (2.3.1) to after 
Philadelphia (2.3.2). 
 
2.3.1 Before Philadelphia 
Independently of how we should understand the relationship between covert values and 
unconscious attitudes (as obtained in the matched guise test; see 2.2.2 above), it may be firmly 
established that Labov, throughout all of his work, operates with social values, pressures, 
motivations that people are unaware of. 
 
(9) 
Social forces exerted upon linguistic forms are of two distinct types, which we 
may call pressures from above, and pressures from below. By below is meant 
“below the level of conscious awareness”. Pressures from below operate upon 
entire linguistic systems, in response to social motivations which are relatively 
obscure and yet have the greatest signification for the general evolution of 
language. […] social pressures from above […] represent the overt process of 
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social correction applied to individual linguistic forms (1972: 123; italics in 
original). 
 
My difficulties with understanding Labov’s position on the driving-force issue may largely be due 
to quite different conceptions of the relationship between the notions of value and consciousness. I 
have no problems with changes from above. These are driven by social evaluations that function as 
pressures by virtue of people’s awareness of the social significance involved, often referred to in 
terms of correctness and prestige. The problem arises with changes from below. How are we to 
understand that social motivations and pressures with the greatest significance for language use in 
the speech community operate below conscious awareness (while also being relatively obscure to 
Labov as a student of the speech community)? 
 In the mechanism-of-linguistic-change paragraph that concludes Labov 1966 (398–
400), it is stressed that “[…] linguistic behaviour is highly normative, or goal-directed. The need for 
a target, a set of norms, is evident in the casual speech of our informants as well as in their formal 
styles”, and it is suggested that: 
 
(10) 
Hypercorrection can operate in a more general sense [i.e. can outdo not only upper middle 
class norms as in the New York study, but target norms in general, TK’s comment] as the 
mechanism of change in response to pressures from below. 
[…] 
Driven by the fear of not conforming, and the need to establish oneself as an authentic 
member of one’s immediate group, the members of the speech community can gradually push 
these labile norms further and further in the direction that they first began to move. 
[…] 
the unconscious tendency of speakers to increase the measure of their identification with their 
immediate group may be stated as the probable mechanism of these changes. 
 
We recall that the first stage of a change from below is characterised by absence of consciousness 
(see section 2.2.1 above). At this stage, the established variation functions as an indicator, “defined 
as a function of group membership” (1972: 178). That is, even though people are not aware of the 
change, it is thought of as driven by the kind of evaluations that delimit and define social groups. 
Such evaluations were also pointed out as the driving force as Labov (1972: 178ff.) summarized his 
experiences with the subsequent stages of “the mechanism of sound change”: 
 
(11) 
[the sound change spread] to the extent that the values of the original subgroup were 
adopted by other groups in the speech community […] As the sound change with its 
associated values reached the limits of its expansion, the linguistic variable became one of 
the norms which defined the speech community, and all members of the speech 
community reacted in a uniform manner to its use (without necessarily being aware of it). 
The variable is now a marker, and begins to show stylistic variation. 
 
As it develops and spreads, a linguistic variable first indicates social group membership, then marks 
both group and style categories. The development and spread of the variable is driven by social 
evaluations (attitudes come first) – which the speakers themselves are unaware of (possibly so even 
at the marker stage). As I have indicated, I am not sure how to understand this. I see two possible 
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readings, which to my mind entail very different theoretical assumptions and methodological 
implications. 
 The one possibility is that the notion of values (social pressures and motivations) 
operating from below the level of conscious awareness refers to a situation in which people pay no 
conscious attention to some of the linguistic variables which constitute their speech community, in 
the sense that they do not (seem able to) comment upon the use and social signification of the 
variants involved. Some of Labov’s formulations point in that direction, e.g.: “To sum up, incoming 
linguistic changes rarely rise to the level of social comment in their initial stages, and not all 
changes become the focus of conscious attention even in their advanced stages” (1972: 309). 
“Though (aw) is not at a high level of conscious social awareness, and is rarely a subject of social 
comment, …” (2001: 187). If the absence of conscious awareness (or conscious attention) results 
from an absence of “social comment”, we may say that below conscious awareness means ‘no 
available discourse’, and such a reading may be taken – depending on the theoretical conceptions of 
“the self and its values” – to allow for the existence of an unconscious awareness of uses and 
values. There is awareness, certainly, but it is implicit, linguistically inexpressible. If this is the 
situation, it might be better conceived of in terms of different levels or layers of 
consciousness/awareness.  
 The other possibility is that we would be mistaken in establishing and foregrounding 
such a distinction between conscious and unconscious awareness, or between layers of awareness. I 
know of no explicit attempt in Labov’s work to theorize levels of consciousness/awareness. It is 
true that the “either–or” treatment of this dimension (above/below, conscious/unconscious, 
aware/unaware) are sometimes replaced by a “more-or-less” treatment (see quote (5)). The 
important point to notice, however, is that values are talked about as decisive for variation and 
change, quite independently of whether consciousness/awareness is said to be involved or not. 
Labov seems to operate with a driving-force role for social evaluations that are conceived of as 
unconscious in the sense of being “beyond consciousness”. 
 Apparently, Labov sees no problem here. Or rather saw no problem. In a more recent 
statement, which is remarkable for its explicit comment on the issue that occupies us here, Labov 
argues that an explanation based on social symbolism (the case in question concerns gender 
differentiation in use) is problematic because “it assigns social sensitivity to early stages of change 
that are remote from levels of social awareness” (2001: 291). 
 As we would expect in the work of a devoted empiricist, the continued failure to establish 
firm, independent evidence for the kind of social sensitivity – covert values – that was assumed to 
drive the more general and interesting changes in use, had to become a problem. Our discussion 
above suggests two possible approaches to the lack-of-evidence problem. On the one hand, if the 
distinction between conscious and unconscious, between overt and covert, is a question of layers of 
consciousness and discursive availability, the natural implication for the student of language change 
would be to concentrate on developing methods for tapping into the deeper layers that people lack a 
language to express. On the other hand, if we operate with a binary ‘either–or’ conception and end 
up with no evidence for covert values in spite of supposedly valid and reliable endeavours to 
establish such evidence, the result might be an instigation to rethink the driving-force issue. As we 
shall see, it is probably right to say that Labov has opted for the latter approach. 
 
2.3.2 After Philadelphia 
The matched guise test of the Philadelphia project was designed to detect indications of covert 
values in terms of a reversed response pattern for friendliness in comparison with job suitability 
(see 2.1.2(ii) above). The result was, however, that “[n]o such tendency emerged. In general, the 
friendship question replicated the results of the job suitability question. […] evidence for covert 
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norms failed to appear” (2001: 216f.). Arguably as a consequence of the fact that “Philadelphians 
have shown a strong pattern of negative evaluation of changes in progress, and no clear evidence of 
covert, positive evaluation of their own behaviour" (2001: 220), a growing tendency to reduce or 
even refute the driving-force role attributed to subjective factors is clearly discernible in Labov’s 
more recent work. 
 
(12) 
[…] Changes from below are systematic changes that appear first in the vernacular, and 
represent the operation of internal, linguistic factors. At the outset, and through most of their 
development, they are completely below the level of social awareness. No one notices them or 
talks about them, and even phonetically trained observers may be unconscious of them for 
many years. It is only when the changes are nearing completion that members of the 
community become aware of them (1994: 78; italics in original). 
 
This description recapitulates earlier formulations as far as the role of consciousness/awareness is 
concerned, but there is no mention of values. Changes from below are not assumed to be driven by 
social valuations (pressures and motivations) in the same way as before (as in quote 9), but are 
instead said to “represent the operation of internal, linguistic factors”. 
 The importance of solving the evaluation problem by searching for the subjective 
correlates, including the covert values in particular, is now clearly downplayed in Labov’s approach 
and argumentation, while the pertinence of ‘interactional frequency’ to the driving-force issue is 
upgraded in the discussion – with reference to Bloomfield’s principle of density, the implications of 
which with regard to the evaluation problem is spelled out: “The principle of density implicitly 
asserts that we do not have to search for a motivating force behind the diffusion of linguistic 
change. The effect is a mechanical and inevitable one; the implicit assumption is that social 
evaluation and attitudes play a minor role” (2001: 20). 
 In discussing other researchers’ claims about the role of attitudes in terms of ‘group 
membership’ or ‘acts of identity’ (exemplified with Sturtevant 1947, and Le Page and Tabouret-
Keller 1985), Labov argues that “[i]f such attitudes are to be used to account for linguistic diffusion, 
it is necessary to posit a covert belief structure”, and goes on to cautiously admit that “such covert 
attitudes and beliefs may actually be involved in linguistic change”, but stresses that “they are not 
usually supported by material evidence” (2001: 191). Even the few cases where attitudinal evidence 
for an effect from ‘local-identification’ processes on sound change in progress have been 
considered fairly secure (as in the Martha’ Vineyard study), are reopened for a possible 
interpretation in line with the density principle: “The question remains as to whether the same 
conclusions could be drawn from frequencies of interaction with speakers with different systems, 
following Bloomfield’s principle of density. In other words, language change may simply reflect 
changes in interlocutor frequencies which are in turn the result of changes in social preferences and 
attitudes” (ibid: 191). In another version of his argument with the acts-of-identity position, Labov 
finds the group-distinguishing function of linguistic differences to be “very likely”, but, because of 
the lack of independent evidence for covert values, “there is always the possibility that the effect is 
due to Bloomfield’s principle of density: that the more often people talk to each other, the more 
similar their speech will be” (ibid: 228). The consequences for the research strategy in general, and 
the possible consequences for the status of the evaluation problem in particular, are radical: 
 
(13) 
The strategy of this inquiry [into whether language change is driven by changes in either 
‘interactional frequency’ or ‘social identifications’] is to draw as much as possible on 
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concrete evidence of actual behaviour as evidence for such questions. To the extent that 
social differences in language behaviour can be mapped onto the matrix of communicative 
interaction, we must give priority to this pattern of interaction in accounting for the 
linguistic facts. […] The account based on covert attitudes is redundant to the extent that the 
network of daily interaction brings people into contact with the new form in proportion to 
their distance from the originating group (2001: 191–2). 
 
Thus, the Philadelphia study puts focus on the communicative interaction of individual people in 
their social networks, and “transform[s] the traditional question “Why does language change?” into 
a different form: “Who are the leaders of linguistic change?” (2001: 29). The characteristics of these 
leaders are determined by studying “their personal statements, their social histories, and their 
philosophies of life” (2001: 33). The study concludes that “ [t]he history of our leaders of linguistic 
change is a history of nonconformity, and their sociolinguistic position is a display of 
nonconformity” (2001: 410). Celeste S. is presented as the prototypical influential person: “She did 
not hesitate to use violence when it was called for. But her primary weapons were linguistic: 
negotiation, persuasion, and denunciation, all enlisted under a profound intolerance for cupidity, 
hypocrisy, and injustice. These are the qualities that make a great leader of linguistic change” 
(2001: 410). The Nonconformity Principle, presented as the major conclusion of the 2001 volume, 
says that: “Ongoing linguistic changes are emblematic of nonconformity to established social norms 
of appropriate behaviour, […] are generated in the social milieu that most consistently defies these 
norms, [and] are generalized to the wider community by those who display the symbols of 
nonconformity in a larger pattern of upward mobility” (2001: 516). 
 One might argue here that the qualities given as characteristic of the leaders of change 
might just as well be referred to as values, and furthermore that the Nonconformity Principle might 
perfectly well be read as a statement to the effect that covert values are the driving-force of change. 
Such a reading would be tantamount to saying that the neighbourhood-based Philadelphia study 
indeed offers a partly new methodological approach to the task of establishing independent 
evidence for covert values. 
 Labov, however, reasons otherwise. The leaders of change are “people taking 
deliberate and conscious actions that identify their social position and define their relations with the 
community”, but… 
 
(14) 
[t]heir linguistic choices cannot be described as actions in the same sense. The level or rate of 
use of a stochastic variable is at the level of consciousness comparable to walking and 
breathing. There is no evidence that attitudes, ideologies, and opinions that people express in 
so many words will bear directly upon linguistic changes from below. These attitudes may 
influence who a person talks to and how often they talk, and so affect the flow of linguistic 
influence and the diffusion of sound changes within and across local social networks (2001: 
409). 
 
Labov does in fact say that the notion of nonconformity “deals with norms that are covert in some 
situations, but emerge more freely in others” (2001: 512). However, his theoretical point is that 
there is no evidence of direct influence from such norms on linguistic changes from below. 
Whatever their mode of existence or appearance might be, attitudes, ideologies and opinions may 
influence patterns of interaction, but the change-producing forces at work in interaction are 
“internal, linguistic factors” – factors of a mechanical kind which should be compared to the forces 
behind walking and breathing rather than social identifications and evaluations. 
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 Labov’s position now seems to be that a driving-force role for social values becomes a 
pertinent issue only if changes can not be accounted for in terms of ‘mechanical’ or ‘structural’ 
forces (see e.g. 2001: 463, 500). In discussing the acts-of-identity type of explanation, Labov 
explicitly refutes a more constructivist view in stressing that he does not see the leaders of change 
(like Celeste S.) “as creating a system of verbal behaviour so much as responding to ambient 
pressures to shift their habitual range of values of Philadelphia variables”, and stresses that “ [a]s 
always, it is good practice to consider first the simpler and more mechanical view that social 
structure affects linguistic output through changes in the frequency of interaction” (2001: 505f.). 
 The continued reduction of a role for social evaluations in language change reaches its 
end point in the recent article on Transmission and diffusion (Labov 2007), in which these two 
change processes are explained in terms of different learning strategies in children and adults, 
without any reference to norms or values at all. 
 
 
3. The driving-force role of covert attitudes: the Danish evidence 
 
Are subjective factors to be seen as essential to language change processes – i.e. as their driving 
force – or as a contingent concomitant of use differences that emerge in virtue of other, objective 
factors? This issue became central to Danish sociolinguistics from its very beginning in the 1970s, 
as it began where Labov seems to have ended. 
 When Brink & Lund argue and, to some extent, document that Copenhagen speech 
(including its HIGH/LOW variation) is spreading to the rest of Denmark, they rely on the density 
principle as their main explanation, presented in a textbook for university students (Brink & Lund 
1974) as the “Napoleon principle”: always make sure you outnumber the enemy where you attack 
him. In other words, wherever variants compete, the victory will go to the most frequently heard 
variant. Brink & Lund admit that prestige may influence the battle and speed up the advance of the 
new variant, but in general they treat, and condemn, attribution of social values to linguistic variants 
as a category mistake, in speakers and researchers alike. 
 The view that attitudes are alien to language use and change (and should be fought 
and eliminated as mistakes) appeared to be in accordance with the facts of the Danish speech 
community as it developed between 1960 and 1980. The traditional dialects stopped being 
transferred to, or acquired by, the rising generations, and were replaced by Copenhagen speech 
which spread to the whole country, most vitally in its LOW variety among young people. In contrast, 
Danish elite discourse (as represented for instance in official teaching guidelines) began extolling 
the value of local dialects, while increasing the complaints (e.g., through letters to the editor) about 
particular features of LOW Copenhagen speech as these became increasingly salient on national 
television. So, what happened at the level of use was the opposite of what happened at the level of 
attitudes. Language ideology did indeed seem to be of little relevance to attempts at explaining 
language change. 
 This picture has been strongly supported by the many empirical studies of language 
attitudes that have been conducted in Denmark from the beginning of the 1980s on: outside of 
Copenhagen, young people are always, on average, found to express more positive attitudes 
towards LOCAL varieties of language than towards LOW Copenhagen speech. This holds true 
whether the data are of a discursive or an experimental kind (see section 2.1) – also subjective 
reaction tests confirm this picture – but with the proviso that the elicited attitudes are consciously 
offered. 
 The ideological climate surrounding Danish varieties appears quite different whenever 
the subjective reaction test is constructed and conducted in such a way that subjects do not become 
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aware of reacting to language varieties (see the discussion in 2.2.2). In this case, we talk of the 
obtained data as subconscious attitudes. Or the point is rather that the attitudes are subconsciously 
offered in the test situation. Besides exploiting natural situations, which is difficult (for an example, 
see Kristiansen 1998), we have succeeded in collecting subconscious attitudes in experimental 
situations (class room settings) from around one thousand young Danes over a period of twenty 
years. The same basic design has been used in more then ten Danish localities, including all parts of 
the country and a wide range of community types. As our claims to a decisive role for covert values 
in language change are based on the results from these experiments, I shall go into some detail with 
the design (as it materialized in the LANCHART project; for further descriptions, see Kristiansen 
fortc. a, and b). 
 Having been based on the so-called verbal guise technique, the experiments in 
question have requested 9th graders (15–16 years old, in their last year of compulsory schooling and 
representing the whole social gamut) to evaluate clips of about 30 seconds taken from different 
speakers talking about the same subject: “What is a good teacher?”. As this design represents a 
relaxation of the control for voice and content effects obtained in a matched-guise design, we have 
used four speakers for each of the accents under study in each community, and have said that 
conclusions as to a decisive effect of accent differences on evaluations are acceptable if, and only if, 
the assumed accents emerge as clear similarities and differences in how the speakers are evaluated. 
This has always turned out to be the case: the accents we have assumed to be relevant in processes 
of social identifications among today’s adolescents (two in Copenhagen, three in all other 
communities) have always emerged from the evaluative patterns. As the high/low social contrast 
seems to have lost much of its significance at the levels of both use and attitudes in later decades, 
we label the three accents MODERN (characterized by previous “low” features and recently 
developed “new” features), CONSERVATIVE (with no or fewer “low” and “new” features), and 
LOCAL (i.e. Copenhagen speech with traces of local prosody). The stimulus speakers are adolescents 
of the same age as the subjects. The same four MODERN and four CONSERVATIVE speakers have been 
used in all communities (all of them are Copenhageners), while the four LOCAL speakers, it goes 
without saying, have been recorded in each of the local communities under study. 
 Three methodological points have been essential to the successful elicitation of 
subconsciously offered attitudes. Firstly, no information has been given to the informants prior to 
their participation about the purpose of the experiment, and the data collection has followed a strict 
procedure in order to avoid questions and comments that might arouse informants’ awareness of the 
purpose. Secondly, the accentual variation represented in the stimulus tape has been “natural” – i.e. 
a part of everyday speech in the local community under study and therefore not salient in any way 
that might make the informants reflect on the purpose of the evaluation as having to do with 
dialectal differences. Thus, the stimulus speakers represented the three accents that are naturally 
present as young speech in any Danish locality today. Thirdly, the measurement instrument – i.e. 
the scales used for evaluations – has been constructed in such a way that informants’ attention was 
not directed to the idea that the evaluations were towards dialect. Thus, evaluative items focusing 
on speech (correct? good? dialect?) had to be left out, of course, in favour of items addressing 
speaker characteristics, e.g. in terms of personality traits (intelligent? trustworthy? cool?). 
 After completion, informants have always been asked what they thought the 
experiment was about. No one has ever suggested anything that could be taken to mean attitudes 
towards “dialects”. When they are told, and listen to the speakers again, informants are always 
amazed how easy it is to hear, now that they know, that the speakers have different accents – which 
is informative on the nature of our “subconscious attitudes”: if ‘naturally occurring’ accent 
differences are that easily made recognizable, they are likely to be included in listeners’ reactions 
also when they are not salient in the evaluative situation. In this sense, I find it evident that people 
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will always have to be aware of the value issues involved in the use of language, if values have a 
role to play in the battle between variants. These values are covert in the sense that they differ 
radically from the overt attitudes expressed in general (common as well as elite) public discourse. 
 Now, the point is that the covert evaluations – in sharp contrast with the overt 
ideology of Danish society – show a pattern which is not in contradiction, but in accordance, with 
what happens at the level of use. In comparison with “pure” Copenhagen speech (whether in 
CONSERVATIVE or MODERN version), young Danes everywhere strongly downgrade the “locally 
coloured” speech (LOCAL) – which in most cases is their own speech. As to the variation within 
Copenhagen speech, the evaluative pattern is again consistently the same all over the country, 
including the city of Copenhagen itself: MODERN is everywhere strongly upgraded on dynamism 
traits (such as self-assured, fascinating, cool), whereas CONSERVATIVE does as well or better on 
superiority traits (such as intelligent, conscientious, trustworthy). 
 Thus, subconsciously offered attitudes show no trace of positive values attached to 
locally coloured speech; there is no trace of the often found distinction between status values 
accorded to standard varieties and solidarity values accorded to non-standard varieties. In terms of 
covert values – i.e. at the subconscious level of social evaluation – the battle for the position as 
“best language” in late-modern Danish society includes only Copenhagen speech and is a matter of 
dynamism versus superiority. 
 This evaluative pattern is reproduced in a remarkably uniform and consistent fashion 
by young people across all of Denmark. At least as far as the younger people are concerned, 
Denmark is a speech community in the Labovian sense, not only by virtue of shared overt values, 
but also, and in particular, in virtue of shared covert values. 
 One might accept, I guess, that our studies have established firm evidence for covert 
values, and at the same time refuse to accept that we have proven a driving-force role for these 
values in the changes of language use. We have established “subjective correlates” – 
subconsciously offered – that are in accordance and not in contradiction with the changes in use, but 
can we say for sure what comes first to the young community: the advance of Copenhagen speech, 
or its evaluative upgrading? Can we decide for sure whether the essential factor in change (the 
driving force) is to be found in the facts of use (the density of interaction) or in the facts of ideology 
(the noncognitive functions, i.e. the connotational meanings, of variation)? Maybe not. 
 It seems to me, however, that the spread of Copenhagen speech is far easier to 
understand as an effect of the covert values we have established than as an effect of the density 
principle. The limited size of Denmark notwithstanding, I find it hard to see how the “Napoleon 
strategy” (always make sure you outnumber the enemy where you attack him) could possibly bring 
Copenhagen speech to all corners of the country. I find it more natural to reason like Labov did on 
Martha’s Vineyard when he found that the facts of use (centralization of the diphthongs /ay/ and 
/aw/) was more sharply stratified by the facts of ideology (orientation towards the island) than by 
any other background factor: “[this] indicates that we have come reasonably close to a valid 
explanation” (1972: 39), or stated even stronger: “It seems plain that the noncognitive functions 
which are carried by these phonological elements are the essential factors in the mechanism of the 
change. This conclusion can be generalized to many other instances of more complex changes […]” 
(1972: 170). 
 As to the development of the nationwide uniformity of covert representations 
(perceptions and evaluations), it can only be understood as an effect of identical experiences with 
language varieties in the national public sphere. The general upgrading of Copenhagen speech and 
downgrading of local speech reflect how these two types of language are treated by the most 
important institutions in young people’s public life: Copenhagen speech is the only “appropriate” 
language in the schools and the spoken media, local speech is “not good enough”. Also the split 
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between MODERN and CONSERVATIVE Copenhagen speech, and their battle for “best language” 
position in terms of dynamism versus superiority, is likely to be a reflection of what young people 
experience as ‘excellence’ in language in the modern media on the one hand, and the more 
traditional institutions of education and business on the other hand (Kristiansen 2001). 1
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Most sociolinguists, I guess, will judge social values and evaluations to be of relevance to the study 
of language use in very many of its aspects, maybe even in all of its aspects. We are quite a few 
who feel that we learned this from Labov, and therefore find reasons to ponder when Labov begins 
the Social Factors volume by stressing the narrowness of the interface between language and 
society. Having pointed out that “[a]t one point in the development of sociolinguistics, it was not 
uncommon for scholars to suggest that the social and linguistic aspects of language were 
coextensive in the sense that each linguistic element had a social aspect or evaluation”, Labov 
continues: “Yet the actual situation seems to be quite the reverse. For the most part, linguistic 
structure and social structure are isolated domains, which do not bear upon each other. […] The 
force of social evaluation, positive or negative, is generally brought to bear only upon superficial 
aspects of language: the lexicon and phonetics” (2001: 28). 
 On the face of it, this just reiterates what Labov has always said, namely that “[i]n 
speaking of the role of social factors influencing linguistic evolution, it is important not to 
overestimate the amount of contact or overlap between social values and the structure of language” 
(1972: 251). In reality, however, the significance of this claim about the relationship between social 
values and language is different ‘after Philadelphia’ from what it was ‘before Philadelphia’, because 
of the general change in theoretical perspective. The claim now reads, and serves, as an argument 
for omitting the evaluation problem from the privileged position it once was accorded among the 
theoretical and methodological problems that has to be solved by the theory of language change. 
 In my reading, Labov’s own failure to establish firm independent evidence for covert 
values appears the decisive reason why he changes position on the driving-force role of social 
values. However, one might suggest that this change has been radicalized as a reaction to how 
social-value explanations have proliferated, in terms of “identity” and “prestige”, mostly without 
any other evidence than the patterns of use themselves: “It is not uncommon to speak of linguistic 
changes as the result of speakers’ desires to assume a certain social identity. But for most linguistic 
changes from below, operating well below the level of social awareness, the only evidence for such 
acts of identity is simply the fact that successive generations change their ways of speaking (2001: 
xv). “In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the association of linguistic 
variables with local identity […]. As with the covert values […], the evidence for the association of 
such values is largely the linguistic distributions themselves” (2001: 228). 
 It is interesting to note that also that other important scholar in Labovian 
sociolinguistics, Peter Trudgill, in recent years has addressed the driving-force issue by stressing the 
role of mechanistic factors at the expense of social evaluations, while expressing similar 
                                                 
1 We hope to be able to shed further light on the driving-force issue in future studies within the 
LANCHART project (www.lanchart.dk); the design of such a study is outlined in Kristiansen and 
Jørgensen 2005; for fuller descriptions of the Danish speech community, see Kristiansen and 
Jørgensen eds. 2003, Gregersen ed. forthcoming.). 
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reservations with regard to the omnipresence of identity as an explanatory notion (Trudgill 2004; 
see the discussion in Language in Society 37/2, 2008). 
 The issue of whether and how different aspects of language may be differently 
available to awareness and/or social evaluation is certainly of importance to our understanding of 
language variation and change, but a discussion of this issue has not been my aim in this chapter 
(for such discussions, see Labov 2001: 25–28; Preston 1996, forthcoming; discussions of ‘salience’ 
as a central notion in this regard may be found in Trudgill 1986, Auer et al. 1998, Kerswill and 
Williams 2002). My aim has been of a more foundational kind: while wholly sharing the scepticism 
towards social-identity explanations which are inferred solely from patterns of use, my intention has 
been to defend the driving-force view of social values which Labov and Trudgill seem to have 
abandoned, and hence to defend a privileged position for the evaluation problem in the study of 
language change – in accordance with Labov’s first assumptions and guidelines, which I find 
fundamentally sound: (i) the role of ideology should be studied and established using independent 
evidence, i.e. in data other than the established patterns of use; (ii) the study of ideological data 
should focus on social motivations ‘from below’ in particular, because (iii) these motivations, 
appearing in subconsciously offered attitudes as covert values, are important to language change in 
a way that overt values are not. These fundamentals of the original Labovian framework are 
sustained by the Danish evidence. My moral goes as follows: the failure to establish independent 
evidence for covert values should stimulate us, as students of language change, to develop our 
methods (allowing for elicitations of subconsciously offered attitudes) rather than lead us to 
abandon the driving-force view of social evaluation. 
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